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Immigration: trends and macroeconomic implications 
Stephen Nickell 
Introduction  
Immigration is a key political issue in most of the developed OECD countries. This is, in part, 
because rates of net inward migration into these countries have been rising over the last two 
decades. However, by comparison with some of the episodes of population movement in the 
past, current immigration rates are comparatively modest. In what follows we focus on a 
particular aspect of this issue, namely the economic consequences of immigration, 
concentrating on impacts on the macroeconomy. 
We begin with an overview of immigration patterns in the OECD, noting the big differences 
between countries, with some receiving immigrants at a rate which has a significant impact 
on the rate of growth of the labour force. Even then, it is plain that the impact of migration is 
generally small relative to the consequences of the much bigger movements of goods and 
capital.  
In Section 2, we briefly discuss the microeconomic outcomes of immigration for the host 
countries. Most of the research in this area is concerned with the impact on the relative pay 
and employment of those groups of the native population most affected, frequently the 
unskilled. Then, in Section 3, we consider the theoretical framework which would enable us 
to analyse the macroeconomic consequences of immigration, both in the short and in the 
long run. This leads on to Section 4, where we look at the empirical evidence on the effect of 
immigration on unemployment and inflation in the host country. We round off our 
investigation with a summary and some general conclusions. 
1.  Immigration in the OECD: an overview 
Stocks of migrants 
In order to obtain a picture of the overall significance of immigration in the OECD countries, 
we present in Tables 1, 2 and 3 some data which give an idea of the numbers of foreigners 
or foreign-born individuals living and working in each country. Note that the numbers of 
foreign-born are always greater than those of foreigners because some proportion of the 
former have, at some stage, been granted citizenship and are no longer classified as 
foreigners.  
In most, but not all countries, the number of immigrants has tended to rise in recent years. 
The variation across countries is significant, with around one quarter of the labour force 
being foreign-born in Australia compared with less than 2% in Finland. Perhaps the most 
striking increases have occurred in Spain, where there have been very large inflows of 





Percentage share of immigrants in the labour force, 1984–2004 
Men Women 
 
1984 1994 2004 1984 1994 2004 
Austria   ...  10.2  9.4  ...  8.8  7.6 
Belgium    9.0 9.8 8.7 5.5 5.7 7.3 
Denmark    2.1 1.9 3.2 1.9 1.8 3.1 
Finland    ... 0.7 1.8  ... 0.8 1.3 
France    8.8 7.4 6.1 4.9 4.9 4.6 
Germany    9.4  10.2  10.3 7.3 6.9 7.8 
Ireland    2.4 3.0 5.9 3.1 2.9 5.5 
Italy    ... 0.6 3.2  ... 0.8 3.3 
Netherlands    4.4 4.8 4.0 2.6 3.1 3.3 
Norway    ... 2.8 4.1  ... 2.7 4.0 
Portugal  0.5 1.0 2.9 0.4 0.9 3.1 
Spain    0.3 0.7 9.5 0.4 0.7 9.6 
Sweden    ... 4.5 4.6  ... 4.4 4.7 
United  Kingdom   4.6 3.5 5.6 4.7 4.0 5.7 
Australia  28.1 26.6 26.3 24.7 24.8 25.3 
New  Zealand  ... 18.4 21.5  ... 18.8 20.2 
United  States  ... 12.6 18.1  ... 10.0 13.9 
Individuals aged 20–59. Data for Australia, Italy, New Zealand and the United States refer to foreign-born 
individuals, otherwise data refer to foreigners. 
Source: Jean and Jimenez (2007, Table 1). 
 
Table 2 
Stocks of foreign-born population 
As a percentage of total population 
 1995  2004   
Austria   11.2
1 13.0 
Belgium   9.7  11.4
2 
Denmark   4.8  6.3 
Finland   2.0  3.2 
France   ...  10.0
3 
Germany   11.5  12.9
2 
Ireland   6.9
4 11.0 
Italy   ...  2.5
5 
Netherlands   9.1  10.6 
Norway   5.5  7.8 
Portugal 5.4  6.7 
Spain   ...  5.3
5 
Sweden   10.5  12.2 
Switzerland 21.4  23.5 
United Kingdom  6.9  9.3 
Australia 23.0  23.6 
Canada 16.6  18.0 
New Zealand  16.2
4 18.8 
United States  9.3  12.8 
1  1998.    
2  2003.    
3  1999.    
4  1996.    
5  2001. 





Stocks of foreign labour force 
As a percentage of total labour force 
  1995   2004   Increase 
Austria   9.9  11.9  2.0 
Belgium   8.3  9.1  0.8 
Denmark   3.0  3.9  0.9 
Finland   1.6
1 1.9  0.3 
France   6.2  5.6  –0.6 
Germany   8.9
2 9.1  0.2 
Ireland   2.9  5.5
3 2.6 
Italy   1.7  6.0
4 4.3 
Netherlands   4.0  3.8  –0.2 
Norway   2.5  6.6  4.1 
Portugal 1.8  5.5  3.7 
Spain   0.8  6.3  5.5 
Sweden   5.1  4.9  –0.1 
Switzerland 18.6  20.6  2.0 
United Kingdom  3.4  5.2  1.8 
Japan 0.1  0.3  0.2 
Stocks of foreign-born labour force 
As a percentage of total labour force 
Austria ...  15.3  ... 
Denmark ...  5.4
4 ... 
Spain
5 1.0  9.4  8.4 
Australia 24.4  24.4  0 
New Zealand  ...  19.9
6 ... 
United States  10.3  15.1  4.8 
1  2000.    
2  1997.    
3  2002.    
4  2003.    
5  Bentolila et al (2007, Fig 5).    
6  2001. 
Source: OECD (2006b, Tables A.2.2, A.2.3). 
 
Flows of migrants 
The numbers on stocks are mirrored by the data on flows reported in Table 4. Spain had the 
largest inflow rate in 2004 and Finland the second smallest. Relative to the size of the 
populations, these numbers are not, however, particularly large. During the mass migrations 
of the 19th and early 20th centuries, movements of people were much larger relative to 
overall populations. For example, the number of immigrants who came to the United States 
in 1901–10 was almost identical to the number who came in 1991–2000 (approx 9 million, 





Per 1,000 inhabitants 
1995 2004 
 
Inflow Outflow  Net  Inflow Outflow  Net 
Austria   ...  ...  ...  13.3  5.9  7.4 
Belgium    5.2 3.3 1.9 7.0 3.6 3.4 
Denmark    6.3 1.0 5.3 3.5 1.7 1.8 
Finland    1.4 0.3 1.1 2.2 0.8 1.4 
France    0.9 ... ...  2.3 ... ... 
Germany    9.7 6.9 2.8 7.3 6.6 0.7 
Ireland    3.8 ... ...  8.2 ... ... 
Italy    ... ... ...  5.5 ... ... 
Netherlands    4.3 1.4 2.9 4.0 1.4 2.6 
Norway    3.8 2.1 1.7 6.1 2.0 4.1 
Portugal  0.5 0.1 0.4 1.3  ...  ... 
Spain    ... ... ...  15.1 ... ... 
Sweden    4.1 1.7 2.4 5.3 1.8 3.5 
Switzerland  12.5 9.6 2.9  13.0 6.5 6.5 
United  Kingdom    3.9 1.7 2.2 8.3 2.5 5.8 
Australia  ... 0.9  ... 7.5 1.5 6.0 
Canada  7.3 ... ...  7.4 ... ... 
Japan  1.7 1.6 0.1 2.9 2.2 0.7 
New  Zealand  15.2 2.9  12.3 8.9 7.1 1.8 
United  States  2.7 ... ...  3.2 ... ... 
Source: OECD (2006b, pp 165–225). 
 
Migration in context 
Migration is also small relative to movements of capital and goods, essentially because the 
migration of persons is subject to significantly greater costs and barriers than the “migration” 
of capital or goods. Despite, or perhaps because of, these costs and barriers, the incentives 
to migrate are substantial. Earnings within occupation are typically several times higher in 
high GDP per capita countries than in low GDP per capita countries (see Freeman (2006, 
Table 2)). So people flows typically move from low to high GDP per capita countries and are 
greater, the smaller the geographical and linguistic distance. They are also bigger, the larger 
the already existing stock of migrants in the receiving countries. Finally, the discrepancy 
between the shares of young adults in the populations of the sending and receiving countries 
is a significant driver (see Hatton and Williamson (2002) for an overview). 
While the flows of immigrants into OECD countries are typically relatively small, they can 
nevertheless make a significant contribution to employment growth. For example, in recent BIS Papers No 50  55
 
 
years, over 40% of employment growth in both the United States and the United Kingdom 
has been down to immigration. Their contribution to employment will, typically, depend on 
why immigrants come. Different countries have different rules governing immigration and the 
proportion of individuals who come specifically to work differs widely from one country to 
another. For example, of the flow of migrants coming to Denmark, Portugal and Switzerland 
in 2004, more than 40% came specifically to work rather than for family or humanitarian 
reasons. By contrast, the equivalent figure for Norway and the United States was less than 
10% (see OECD (2006, Chart 1.2)). Of course, the fact that a migrant enters a country for 
family or humanitarian reasons does not necessarily mean they do not work. 
Cross-border commuting 
At the opposite extreme to more or less permanent migration is the notion of cross-border 
commuting. Given free movement of labour within the European Union, there are no legal 
barriers to living in one country and working in another. Despite this, in 1999 a mere 0.2% of 
the total EU workforce commuted to another member country (European Commission 
(2001)). Even in regions located close to national borders, only 1.5% of the labour force can 
be characterised as cross-border commuters. As we can see in Table 5, not surprisingly, 
Luxembourg provides the highest number of cross-border commuters of any region. 
 
Table 5 
Cross-border commuters and share in total regional employment  
Border region  Number of commuters  Share in total regional 
employment (%) 
Belgian-German   6,300  0.67 
Belgian-Dutch   22,900  0.67 
Belgian-French   24,400  0.88 
Danish-German   2,500  0.76 
Danish-Swedish   3,000  0.13 
German-French   61,700  2.50 
German-Dutch   33,100  0.76 
German-Austrian   21,000  0.96 
Spanish-French (incl Andorra)   4,100  0.17 
Spanish-Portuguese   4,000  0.15 
French-Italian (incl Monaco)   27,900  1.10 
French-British   2,700  0.28 
Irish-British   11,500  1.42 
Italian-Austrian   1,900  0.22 
Finnish-Swedish 900  0.41 
Luxembourg (with Belgium, 
Germany and France)  79,200  4.73 
Source: Van Houtum and Van Der Velde (2004, Table 1). 
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More recently, the proportion of cross-border commuters in the European Union has risen to 
a number closer to 0.4% (see OECD (2007a, Figure 8.1)), basically because of the 
accession of the new member states. Slovakia, for example, has around 5% of its working 
age population commuting to the Czech Republic and Austria. In part, of course, this is a 
consequence of the recent division of Czechoslovakia into its two constituent parts. Overall, 
cross-border commuting is simply not big enough to have any serious macroeconomic 
implications. This is not, however, true of migration overall. So, in what follows, we look at 
the consequences of migration for receiving countries. Ultimately we are interested in the 
macroeconomic implications, but we first consider the microeconomic outcomes. 
2. Immigration:  the  microeconomic outcomes 
The basic argument here is that an exogenous increase in labour supply in any particular 
labour market will lower the equilibrium wage for market participants. If there are constraints 
which attenuate this wage adjustment, then there will be a rise in unemployment. The 
empirical question is then, how big are these effects in practice? In particular, are the native 
workers, notably the unskilled, hit by weaker wage growth and/or higher unemployment as a 
result of immigration? Underlying this research is a widespread view among the general 
public that immigrants take jobs away from native workers (see Dustmann and Glitz (2006)). 
The answer to the basic empirical question is the subject of an ongoing controversy 
exemplified by Borjas (2003) and Card (2005). In an earlier paper, Card (1990) examines the 
impact of the Mariel Boatlift of Cubans into the Miami labour market and finds little impact on 
the wages of natives. Borjas (2003) argues that such an analysis gives a misleading 
impression because regional labour markets are not self-contained. Thus, as immigrants 
move into a region, natives move out, thereby attenuating wage effects. So he considers the 
impact of immigrants on wages in national age/education groups and finds a significant 
impact on wages in the United States. An immigrant inflow of 10% of the labour force lowers 
the wages of natives by 3 or 4%. Applying the same analysis to Germany, Bonin (2005) finds 
very much smaller effects and no measurable employment effects. 
To shed further light on this issue, Card (2005) reports an analysis of high school dropouts 
(HSDs) in the United States. In 2000, the proportion of HSDs in the native workforce was 
14.7%, whereas among immigrants it was 38.2%. Immigration led to huge variation in the 
changes in the proportion of HSDs across cities over the period 1980–2000. On average, this 
proportion fell from 24.3% to 17.8% during the period. But in cities like Los Angeles, Miami 
and Houston, which have seen a huge increase in their immigrant populations, there have 
been increases or only tiny falls in HSD proportions. Overall, there is a very strong 
relationship across cities between increases in the immigrant population and increases in the 
proportion of HSDs. This suggests that there has not been a very large offsetting mobility 
response of native HSDs. 
So what has been the consequence of these differential changes in the ratios of high school 
dropouts to high school graduates in US cities? The answer is only a very weak impact of 
these shifts in the labour supply ratios on either relative employment or relative wage rates. 
There is some slight impact on relative employment rates and no significant impact on 
relative wages. 
So the overall conclusions are: 
(i)  Increases in the number of immigrants into localities have generated significant 
increases in the proportion of low-skilled workers, indicating no important offsetting 
effects via native mobility. 
(ii)  Local shifts in the proportion of low-skilled workers have minimal effects on low-skill 
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How can this be, given that standard economics indicates that a significant increase in labour 
supply should lower wage rates and/or employment rates? The evidence in this case rules 
out the offsetting native migration explanation. One possible explanation is that immigrant 
flows induce capital flows to the immigrant receiving areas. If this leads to the growth of 
immigrant employing industries selling output at fixed world prices, wages would not 
respond. The expansion of clothing industry “sweatshops” in New York and Los Angeles 
would be an example. However, Lewis (2004) and Card (2005) indicate that most of the 
adjustment to the immigrant inflow has been within industries. An alternative explanation is 
that there is a weaker adoption of advanced technology, which is complementary to skilled 
labour, in the presence of larger numbers of the unskilled. This would offset the wage effects 
of shifts in the proportion of the unskilled workers. Lewis (2005) and Beaudry et al (2006) 
provide some evidence in favour of this hypothesis.  
The vast majority of the existing research on migration has been concerned with 
microeconomic issues, particularly the impact of immigration on the relative pay and 
employment rates of a variety of particular groups. By contrast, there is very little research on 
the standard macroeconomic questions, notably the impact of immigration on inflation and 
unemployment. This will be the subject of the remainder of the paper. 
3. Immigration  and  the macroeconomy: theory and some facts 
In the simplest macroeconomic model, an influx of migrants lowers the capital/labour ratio, 
lowers the real wage, raises the return on capital and generates a net welfare gain for 
natives. The gains accruing to the owners of capital are greater than the losses faced by the 
supplier of labour.
1 
In the long run, the higher return to capital stimulates investment and in the new equilibrium 
the capital/labour ratio, the real wage and the marginal product of capital will revert to their 
original levels under constant returns. The natives neither gain nor lose and the economy is 
simply that bit bigger. This simple model immediately suggests that we should divide the 
impact of immigration into short-run and long-run effects, and we begin with the latter. 
Long-run effects 
There are two possible long-run macroeconomic effects worth noting. The first is that, for one 
reason or another, immigrants permanently reduce the equilibrium unemployment rate. This 
will happen if, for example, immigrant workers are more flexible and reduce the extent of skill 
mismatch, or if they are more elastic suppliers of labour with higher levels of motivation and 
reliability. As OECD (2006) indicates,
2 “international as well as UK evidence suggests 
immigration can serve to make the labour market as a whole more fluid and wages less 
                                                  
1   If immigration raises employment from L to L1, and we suppose production is 
F(L), F ' > O, F " < O, then we have: 
Gains to native workers = (F '(L1) – F '(L))L < O 
Gains to native capitalists = (F(L1) – F ' (L1) L1) – (F (L) – F ' (L) L) 
So total gain is 
F (L1) – F (L) – F ' (L1) (L1 – L) 
which is positive since F "< O (use mean value theorem). 
2   Quoted in Blanchflower et al (2007). 58  BIS Papers No 50
 
 
sensitive to demand fluctuations”. So this is not just a theoretical possibility. This effect may, 
however, decrease over very long periods of time as migrants become more like the native 
population.  
The second possible long-run effect arises if the skill profile of migrants differs from that of 
natives and the number of migrants is big enough to have a significant impact on the skill mix 
of the population as a whole. If migrants are more skilled, on average, than natives and there 
is capital-skill complementarity, then in the long run the capital/labour ratio will be higher and 
productivity will be higher. The opposite will apply if migrants are less skilled, on average.  
Looking across the OECD, there is huge variation in the education profile of migrants relative 
to natives which derives, in part, from differences in the regulations governing migration. In 
Table 6, we present the patterns of education of migrants and natives in the continental 
European economies and, in Table 7, we can see how much more likely it is that the highly 
educated will work. Thus, in Denmark, Ireland, the Netherlands and Sweden, we find that 
migrants and natives have quite similar education profiles, with high proportions of tertiary 
and upper secondary employees. By contrast, migrants in Italy and Spain are far less well 
educated than natives, with a very high proportion at the lowest level. Interestingly enough, 




Educational attainment of the employed by birth status, 2005 
Native-born Foreign-born 
Completed studies 
10 years ago or less 
Present in country  




















Austria    15 60 25 21 55 24 
Belgium    9 40 50 29 23 48 
Denmark    20 42 38 26 33 40 
France    17 38 45 40 25 35 
Ireland    8 38 54 14 37 48 
Italy    14 55 31 45 45 11 
Netherlands    23 41 36 23 47 30 
Portugal  41 27 32 55 28 17 
Spain    26 22 52 41 37 22 
Sweden  10 46 44 16 41 43 
Source: OECD (2007, Table 1.10). 
 





Percentage employment rates by education,  
natives and foreign-born, 2003–04 
Native Foreign-born 
Education level  Education level   
Low Medium High  Low Medium High 
Austria    43.6 73.1 84.1 54.3 68.5 77.5 
Belgium    41.9 66.3 83.9 33.9 53.5 73.7 
Denmark   61.0  81.8  87.9 44.3 57.5 64.2 
Finland    47.7 72.3 85.0 39.1 64.1 69.5 
France    47.1 70.6 78.7 47.8 62.1 70.8 
Germany    40.2 69.1 84.5 45.1 62.4 68.1 
Ireland    48.0 71.5 86.5 44.4 63.8 76.5 
Italy    45.6 65.9 81.4 59.5 67.4 78.8 
Netherlands    63.9 80.9 88.1 50.7 69.9 78.3 
Norway    52.6 77.9 87.5 43.9 67.9 79.8 
Portugal  66.5 62.3 87.6 67.5 70.0 83.6 
Spain    53.4 60.2 79.5 61.2 68.9 73.2 
Sweden    57.7 80.4 87.4 45.9 66.8 76.0 
Switzerland  57.1 80.4 92.4 63.4 74.1 81.9 
United Kingdom   52.5  77.5  88.1  39.3  66.9  81.8 
Australia  59.7 80.0 85.7 51.4 68.8 78.4 
Canada  53.1 76.2 83.7 51.0 69.1 75.4 
United States  35.9  71.0 83.0 58.6 70.0 77.6 
Source: OECD (2006b, Table 1.10, p 53). 
 
Short-run effects 
Consider a surge in the number of immigrants. Such an increase in the flow of labour into the 
economy has a variety of possible effects. The easiest way to think of these is to consider 
the effects on aggregate demand and aggregate supply at a given monetary policy stance. 
On the demand side, the rise in the population will plainly generate an increase in 
expenditure. It is probable that immigrants will spend a lower proportion of their incomes than 
natives because of remittances, and that they will make a lower initial expenditure on 
durables and have higher savings because immigrants often have lesser entitlements to 
state benefits than natives, at least initially. On the supply side, the surge of migrants will 
typically lead to an increase in potential aggregate supply with an initial rise in unemployment 
and effective labour supply more generally.  
The overall impact on the economy will depend on the temporal pattern of these short-run 
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observe a short-run increase in output accompanied by heightened inflationary pressure. 
This will tend to be offset by a tightening of monetary policy tending to reduce the surge in 
economic activity. By contrast, if the growth in aggregate supply tends to dominate, we will 
see a smaller increase in output and downward pressure on inflation which will then lead to a 
loosening of monetary policy and a further increase in output. This pattern will be 
accentuated if the rise in migration leads to enhanced labour market flexibility and a fall in the 
equilibrium rate of unemployment, for then there is an increase in potential output beyond 
that generated simply from the rise in the labour force. 
These shorter-term effects of immigration are likely to be influenced by labour and product 
market institutions. If these tend to increase the rigidities in the economy, this will slow down 
the rate at which migrants tend to be absorbed into the economy, lower the rate at which 
aggregate supply adjusts and increase any inflationary pressures arising from the rise in 
aggregate demand generated by the migrants. 
Before looking at the evidence on the macroeconomic consequences of increased migration, 
it is worth considering the argument that immigration may have helped to flatten the Phillips 
curve, a phenomenon which has been noted in some countries in recent years. 
The Phillips curve reflects the relationship between changes in inflation, ∂π / ∂t say, and 
some measure of economic activity relative to potential. If the latter is proxied by the 
proportional change in output, Δγ say, then migration will certainly tend to flatten the 
relationship. If higher levels of Δγ are associated with higher inflows of migrants via a 
demand-pull mechanism, then it is plain that this will help to suppress inflationary pressures 
and flatten this type of “Phillips curve”. However, if we take the standard Phillips curve as: 
∂π / ∂t = a − β (u − u*) 
where u is unemployment and u* is the equilibrium rate, then it is hard to see why any 
relaxation of barriers to migration will lower β. It may, for example, reduce fluctuations in 
unemployment as migrants move in and out with the level of domestic activity. Or it may 
reduce the equilibrium unemployment rate as we have already noted. But why migration 
should impact on β is not clear. If, of course, the analysis does not properly control for 
reductions in u*, then it will indeed appear that β has decreased and the Phillips curve will 
appear to have flattened. This is, however, a spurious conclusion based on omitted variable 
bias. 
4. Immigration  and  the  macroeconomy: evidence 
While there is a fair bit of evidence on the aggregate impact of migration on employment and 
unemployment in the short and medium run, there is very little which considers the 
consequences of this for inflation. We consider these two points in turn.  
Migration and unemployment 
An interesting analysis of the temporal pattern of unemployment effects arising from 
significant immigration is provided by Hercowitz and Yashiv (2002). They analyse the 
substantial migration from the former Soviet Union to Israel in the 1990s, which resulted in an 
18% increase in Israel’s population in a decade. Because of the different temporal patterns of 
the impact of immigration on aggregate demand and aggregate supply, they find an initial 
positive impact on employment followed by a later negative impact and ultimately no impact 
at all. Thus, in the Israel context, initially aggregate demand dominates, then aggregate 
supply and finally there is no long-run effect. 
Angrist and Kugler (2003) provide some evidence on the role of labour and product market 
institutions in determining the short-run consequences of immigration but a more BIS Papers No 50  61
 
 
comprehensive empirical analysis is provided by Jean and Jimenez (2007). They use panel 
data (1984–2003) for 17 OECD economies. Their basic analysis suggests that an increase in 
the number of immigrants equivalent to 1% of the labour force leads to the unemployment 
rate being, successively, 0.2, 0.3 and 0.4 percentage points higher one, two and three years 
later before fading away to a zero impact after around six years. This suggests that, overall, 
the aggregate supply effect dominates in the short run with these unemployment effects 
being accompanied by downward pressure on inflation.
3 
Turning to their evidence on institutions, Jean and Jimenez find that the impact of strong 
employment protection laws is to slow down and extend the unemployment effects of 
migration as a consequence of more sluggish employment adjustment. The extent of product 
market regulation is also important. A high degree of such regulation tends to magnify the 
unemployment effects throughout, essentially because the economy is slower to adjust to the 
new sources of labour supply. By contrast, in the presence of very low levels of product 
market regulation, the unemployment effects are negligible. 
Inflation and other macroeconomic effects 
There is certainly a broad acceptance in the United Kingdom, for example, that immigration 
has had a tendency to reduce inflationary pressure. For example, Blanchflower
4 et al (2007), 
in their conclusions, note that “… at present it appears that A8 immigration has tended to 
increase supply by more than it has increased demand in the UK (in the short run), and 
thereby acted to reduce inflationary pressure”. However, rigorous empirical analysis in this 
area is in short supply, with perhaps to most telling contribution to be found in Bentolila et al 
(2007).
5  
Their analysis first reveals how to adjust the derivation of the New Keynesian Phillips curve 
to incorporate immigration, starting from Blanchard and Gali (2006). They then estimate their 
model using Spanish data and discover that the very high levels of immigration into Spain in 
recent years have been responsible for a negative impact on inflation of 0.9 percentage 
points per annum. This arises essentially because immigrants have raised effective labour 
supply and reduced the natural rate of unemployment. These developments have helped 
macroeconomic policy to bring down the overall unemployment rate by almost 7 percentage 
points since 1999 with minimal inflationary consequences. This is an example of an apparent 
flattening of the Phillips curve deriving from a reduction in the equilibrium unemployment 
rate. 
5.  Summary and conclusions 
Our overall conclusions are as follows:  
(i)  In nearly all of the developed OECD countries, net immigration flows are positive 
and increasing. In a small number, notably Austria, Spain and Switzerland, annual 
net inflows are currently more than ½% of the population. In Spain, the proportion of 
                                                  
3   Although inflation is not discussed by Jean and Jimenez (2007). 
4   Blanchflower is, of course, a member of the Bank of England Monetary Policy Committee, so his views on this 
matter have practical implications for UK macroeconomic policy. A8 refers to the eight new accession 
countries in the European Union. 
5   Izquierdo et al (2007) present some results which are consistent with those of Bentolila et al (2007). 62  BIS Papers No 50
 
 
foreign-born individuals in the labour force has risen by 8.4 percentage points in a 
decade. 
(ii)  Cross-border commuting is typically very small except in Luxembourg. Overall 
across the European Union, the proportion of cross-border commuters in the labour 
force is less than ½%, and even in regions close to national borders it is only 1½%. 
(iii)  The weight of the evidence suggests that the impact of unskilled immigration on the 
relative employment and wages of the native unskilled population is minimal. This is 
by no means a settled issue, however, and some economists remain convinced that 
there are significant effects. 
(iv)  There is some evidence to suggest that immigration makes the labour market more 
flexible, effectively reducing the equilibrium unemployment rate in the long run. In 
particular, high rates of immigration into Spain have helped the Spanish economy to 
reduce overall unemployment substantially without inflationary consequences.  
(v)  In the very short run, a rise in immigration leads to an increase in unemployment 
which is much enhanced in the presence of high levels of product market regulation. 
The rise in unemployment lasts longer when employment protection laws are more 
restrictive. 
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